We test whether generosity is related to political preferences and partisanship in Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States using incentivized dictator games. The total sample consists of more than 5,000 respondents. We document that support for social spending and redistribution is positively correlated with generosity in all four countries. Further, we show that donors are more generous towards copartisans in all countries, and that this e¤ect is stronger among supporters of left-wing political parties. All results are robust to the inclusion to an extensive set of control variables, including income and education.
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Why are some people left-wing and others right-wing? One popular idea is that left-wing people are more other-regarding than right-wing people. The "bleeding hearts" of liberals and "heartless and cold"conservatives are typical stereotypes in U.S. politics (see e.g., Farwell & Weiner 2000) . In contrast, social scientists often focus on economic self-interest as the determinant of political preferences and most economic-political models assume that voters are self-interested. Yet the explanatory power of self-interest in empirical studies is usually quite low. 1 This discrepancy between theoretical assumptions and empirical …ndings highlights the importance of …nding other determinants of political preferences. 2 For example, political preferences might be related to "deep" preference parameters that also determine choices in other domains, e.g. occupation.
In this paper, we focus on the relationship between social and political preferences. Spec…cally, we investigate whether generosity in the dictator game is related to political preferences and partisanship. 3 Our focus on generosity is motivated by the fact the there are two distinct reasons to support social spending and redistribution. On the one hand, people might support social spending because they directly bene…t from it. This "demand side-view" of social policy is the standard perspective in economic-political models. However, there are also reasons to consider the "supply side" of redistribution: voters might prefer high levels of spending and taxation because they want to help people they think deserve government support. This latter view suggests that preferences for social spending could be related to generosity. The di¤erence between the "demand"and "supply side"view is important for a wide range of questions in political science, not least the sources of public opinion and policy 1 See for instance the survey by Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier (2007) . There are also studies that con…rm the view that self-interest a¤ect political preferences, see Richter (2006) , Elinder et al. (2008) and Manacorda et al. (2011) for some recent examples. 2 The existing literature on the sources of political preferences ranges from behavioral genetic evidence (e.g. Alford et al. 2005 , Benjamin et al. 2012 , accounts rooted in early socialization (e.g. Green et al. 2002 , Johnston 2006 , to accounts focusing on short-term in ‡uences (e.g. Zaller 1992, Page & Jones 1979) . Most closely related to this paper, there is a substantial literature suggesting that political preferences are related to personality (Mondak 2010 , Hatemi & McDermott 2011 , Settle et al. 2009 , Morton et al. 2011 . 3 In the dictator game (Forsythe et al. 1994) , one participant (the dictator or donor) decides how to split a sum of money between herself and an another anonymous participant in the study. The receiver has no choice over the distribution. 2 preferences, the basis of electoral competition, and the ideological positioning of political parties.
We carry out our study in four countries: Canada, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States. The dictator game questions were incentivized in all countries and in Canada, Sweden and United Kingdom we use large, representative samples. In total our samples comprise more than 5,000 respondents. Although there are some design di¤erences across our four country studies, the results are remarkably consistent.
Our …rst main …nding is that generosity in the dictator game is positively related to political preferences for typical left-wing policies, in particular to preferences for spending on public goods. Except for the United Kingdom, the estimated coe¢ cients become stronger when we control for a rich set of covariates, including income and education. The robustness of our results indicates that the relationship between generosity and support for public spending is not driven by omitted variables. Rather, our results support the view that people who support redistributive policies are fundamentally di¤erent in terms of "deep"preference parameters (Benjamin et al. 2012 . Respondents thus seem to be willing to give up private consumption in order to behave consistently with their political ideals, i.e. they "put their money where their mouth is". While our results do not rule out that self-interest also a¤ects political preferences, the size of the estimated coe¢ cients suggest that the "supply side"perspective is relevant for understanding redistributive policies.
For Canada and Sweden, the result that respondents with left-wing sympathies are more generous is con…rmed when we consider support for political parties instead of particular policies. Supporters of the Democratic party are more generous than Republicans in the US sample, but the lower power in this sample implies that the e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant. However, in the UK, Tory supporters are more generous than those who support Labour, despite the fact that Labour supporters are more supportive of social spending.
Dividing the sample by strength of partisanship, we …nd that the link between generosity and social spending is signi…cantly stronger among non-partisans than partisans in the UK. 3 We do not …nd a similar pattern in the other countries in our study. This result indicates that identi…cation with political parties in the UK may be driven by factors related to generosity in a way that partly o¤sets the correlation between generosity and support for spending on public goods.
Our second main set of results relate to the in-group e¤ect with respect to political partisanship …rst documented by Fowler & Kam (2007) . Asking donors to state how much they want to give to supporters of di¤erent political parties, we …nd that subjects are signi…cantly less generous when donating money to someone that supports a di¤erent political party than their own. Interestingly, in all four countries, it is particularly supporters of left-wing parties that discriminate depending on the partisanship of the recipient.
The in-group e¤ect shows either that voters care directly about other people's party preferences or that they take partisanship as a signal of deeper political values, preferences or personality traits that they care about. 4 Regardless of which explanation is true, the existence of an in-group e¤ect is likely to induce people to associate with others who share their political values (Eaves & Hatemi 2008 , Alford et al. 2011 . For example, people might prefer to live in neighborhoods where many people vote for the same party, leading to political segregation in the housing market. 5 Such "political assortative matching" among friends, colleagues, neighbors and mates is likely to exacerbate political polarization through two di¤erent mechanisms. First, a large literature has shown that people's political behavior is in ‡uenced by the friends, neighbors and peers they interact with. 6 Second, in countries with majoritarian election systems, geographical segregation that makes constituencies more 4 See Gerber et al. (2011) for a review about the literature on personality traits and political behavior. On a related note, there is a long-standing literature in social psychology demonstrating that similarity in attitudes more generally predicts altruistic behavior, attraction and friendship. See, for example, Batson et al. (1981) , Byrne (1961) , Byrne (1971 ), McGrath (1984 and Newcomb (1961) . 5 See Rodden (2010) for an overview of the literature about geographical sorting along political lines. 6 The literature on social interaction from person to person and political behavior includes, for example, Sheingold (1973 ), Tedin (1980 ), Weatherford (1982 , Huckfeldt & Sprague (1991) and Tam Cho et al. (2006) . In a related vein, Madestam et al. (2011) use weather as an instrumental variable for the size of Tea Party rallies and show that large rallies caused an increase in turnout in favor of the Republicans in the 2010 Congressional elections. Another related literature studies social pressure and voter mobilization, see Eldersveld (1956) , Gerber & Green (2000) , Gerber et al. (2008) , Davenport et al. (2010) , , Mann (2010) and Bond et al. (2012). de…nitively left or right induces political candidates to position themselves away from the political centre. 7
An e¤ect of in-group favoritism on polarization could have consequences that go beyond the political system. For example, Gradstein & Justman (2002) argue that polarization has a negative e¤ect on national income because it increases transaction costs. Relatedly, Lindqvist & Östling (2010) show that political polarization is strongly negatively correlated with economic performance.
The …nding that the in-group e¤ect is strongest among left-wing donors opens the door to an interesting theoretical possibility: some people may exhibit stronger support for social spending when other voters are more supportive of higher spending, implying that a shift to the left in the political preferences of an electorate may be self-reinforcing. Such a complementarity between political preferences could give rise to multiple voting equilibria. 8
The dictator game has been replicated numerous times and studies have consistently shown that subjects donate non-negligible amounts (see e.g. Camerer 2003 , List 2007 . The typical …nding is that a majority of subjects either keep everything or give away exactly half of the money (see e.g. Engel 2011). Andreoni & Bernheim (2009) argue that such a distribution of responses is most easily explained by adherence to a norm to share the money exactly equally combined with social image concerns. One interpretation of our …ndings is therefore that the 50-50 sharing norm is stronger among people who support redistribution and social spending. In other words, support for an underlying sharing norm might be re ‡ected both in dictator game generosity and support for "generous"government policies.
Most previous dictator game experiments have been done with university students and are therefore not representative of the general population (see Levitt & List 2007) . University subjects constitute a selected sample of the population and they are typically also selfselected into participating in experiments. We address this critique by including the dictator games in large national surveys in Canada, the UK and Sweden. However, we also report the results from a laboratory experiment in the US which uses a convenience sample of university students. In addition, we brie ‡y discuss the results from a pilot experiment in Sweden which was conducted with public high school students who took part in the experiment as a part of their regular teaching.
We are not aware of any previous studies that relate preferences for redistribution and social spending to social preferences measured by the dictator game or related games. 9 There are a few studies, however, that have studied the relationship between social preferences and political partisanship. Studies with US (student) subjects have not found an e¤ect of partisanship on generosity in dictator games (Fowler 2006 , Fowler & Kam 2007 or behavior in ultimatum, trust and public goods games (Alford & Hibbing 2007 , Anderson et al. 2005 . Fowler & Kam (2007) document that donors, and in particular Democrat donors, are more generous toward recipients who support the same party. We show that the political in-group e¤ect holds also in representative samples in three additional countries (Canada, Sweden and the UK). In addition, we show that the in-group e¤ect is consistently stronger among left-leaning partisans.
We are aware of two European studies focusing on the relationship between partisanship and pro-social preferences in large national survey samples. Both studies …nd a systematic relationship between partisanship and pro-social preferences. Damgaard (2008) …nds that left-wing respondents in Denmark contribute less in public goods games. Fehr et al. (2003) report results from a trust game with a representative sample of Germans. They …nd that Social Democrats and Christian Democrats are more trusting and that Christian Democrats are less trustworthy.
Study Design
In Canada, UK and Sweden, the dictator games were included in surveys conducted by commercial public opinion research …rms. In the US study, the dictator games were instead incorporated into a laboratory experiment. In addition, we brie ‡y report the results from a Swedish pilot study that was conducted as a classroom experiment in upper secondary schools in Stockholm. The details about this pilot experiment are relegated to the Appendix. In this section we describe the design of the four main country studies.
Subjects
The Canadian, Swedish and UK studies were conducted as online surveys. The aim of the surveys was to obtain a representative sample of the general population. Yet it is clear that online surveys cannot be fully representative (e.g. due to non-universal Internet access and attendant sampling problems). The Canadian survey was conducted in May 2007 and consisted of 5,399 respondents. Respondents in the second half of May (2,771 in total) were also administered questions about willingness-to-pay for public goods. 10 The UK survey was conducted in six waves from December 2009 to January 2010 with a total of 1,462 respondents. The Swedish survey was conducted in May 2011 and included 1,036 respondents.
The US study was conducted as a part of a computerized laboratory experiment at the University of California-San Diego between November 2010 and March 2011. 262 students participated in the experiment. The advantage of laboratory experiments is that they provide a higher degree of control. The obvious drawback is that a sample of students at a prestigious university is not representative of the general US population. The results from the US study should therefore be interpreted with caution. 10 Respondents were randomized into participating in the …rst and second half of the study. Furthermore, the R 2 is 0.01 when regressing an indicator variable for whether we observe answers to the willingness-to-pay questions on our full set of control variables. Non-response is also uncorrelated with generosity in the dictator game.
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In order to provide a better view of the representativeness of the participants in the four studies, Table A1 in the Appendix compares the sample averages of some covariates to the population-wide averages in the four countries. Respondents in the online surveys are representative with respect to gender, but are 8 to 10 years older, better educated and have higher earnings than the population averages. Since our samples do not appear to be fully representative, we analyze in Section 3 whether the relationship between generosity and political preferences interact with age, gender, income or education. With Canada as one possible exception, we generally …nd little evidence of this. The non-representativeness of our survey samples are therefore unlikely to bias our empirical estimates.
Survey Questions
All four country studies include incentivized dictator games (to be described below) as well as a battery of questions about ideology, party identi…cation, opinions about speci…c political proposals and basic demographics. 11 The ordering and exact wording of the questions used in the paper are available in the Appendix.
In the UK, Swedish and US studies, we included a question asking respondents to place themselves on a left-right scale (from 1 to 10 in Sweden and the US and from 0 to 10 in the UK). In the Swedish case it was explicitly mentioned which political parties are usually considered to belong to the right and left. 12 The US study also included a question taken from the World Values Survey which asked respondents to place their views on a 1 to 10 scale from "Incomes should be made more equal" to "We need larger income di¤erences as incentives for individual e¤ort". In the US and Swedish study, we included a question (again taken from the World Values Survey) which asked respondents to place their views on a ten-point scale ranging from "The government should take more responsibility to ensure 11 The Canadian, UK and US surveys also include a number of questions not used in this paper. 12 There is clear distinction between left-wing and right-wing parties in Sweden, with the exception of an anti-immigration party ("Sverigedemokraterna"). Consequently, 95 percent of respondents who were classi…ed as left-wing based on the ideology question identi…ed with a left-wing political party and 96 percent of those who were classi…ed as right-wing identi…ed with a right-wing party (excluding the anti-immigration party). that everyone is provided for" to "People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves". In the US study we also asked respondents to trade-o¤ higher taxes against more spending on health and social services while in the UK respondents were simply asked whether taxes should be increased or cut.
In addition, we included a number of questions about willingness-to-pay (WTP) for public goods and publicly provided private goods. The format of these questions varied slightly between studies (see the Appendix for details). For example, Swedish respondents were asked sequentially if they would be willing to pay a particular amount. The WTP questions were not designed to obtain meaningful absolute valuations -the purpose was only to obtain a measure of the within-country relative valuations of respondents. The …rst WTP question (used in all but the UK study) asked respondents whether they would support carbon taxes if they knew that it would increase their energy-related expenditure by some stated amount per year. The second question asked respondents how much they would be willing to pay per year in higher taxes to cut waiting times in medical care. The third question concerned how much more respondents would be willing to pay in taxes to abolish tuition fees for university education. Since there are no tuition fees in Sweden, we instead included a question about whether respondents wanted to introduce tuition fees and, if so, how high they should be.
The wording of the party identi…cation questions varies slightly between countries, but we aimed to stay close to the wording used in the American National Election Studies. For example, in Canada the wording is: "Thinking about federal politics in Canada, generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as Liberal, Conservative, N.D.P. or none of these?"
In the other countries, we restrict attention to the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties in the UK, the Republican and Democratic parties in the US, and the eight political parties in the Swedish parliament. The party identi…cation question was immediately followed by a question about the strength of partisanship (on a scale that di¤ered slightly across countries).
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All four studies included a number of questions about demographic background characteristics which are included as control variables in the regressions. Details about the included control variables can be found at the bottom of Table 1 . The exact wording of the survey questions used for each country can be found in Table A2 to A5 in the Appendix.
Dictator Game Design
In the dictator game, respondents who are given the role of "dictator"are asked to allocate a …xed monetary endowment between themselves and a recipient. The optimal strategy for a completely sel…sh dictator is to keep the entire endowment for herself, yet a large body of research has shown that a non-trivial fraction of dictators donate positive amounts.
All four country studies included an incentivized dictator game question where the respondent split a sum of money between herself and another anonymous respondent in the survey. Respondents in Canada and the UK were also asked how much they would be willing to give to a respondent identifying with one of the three major political parties in respective country. The order of the dictator game questions were randomized for each respondent.
In the Swedish survey, respondents were …rst asked how much they would donate to anonymous recipient. Respondents were then asked how much they would donate to a "leftwing" or "right-wing" respondent. We randomized the order of these questions. Finally, respondents were asked to state how much they would like to someone supporting the largest right-wing party ("Moderaterna") and to someone supporting the largest left-wing party ("Socialdemokraterna"). The order of these two questions was again randomized.
The US experiment also began by asking respondents to state their donations to an anonymous participant in the experiment. Thereafter, half of the respondents were asked how much they would donate to a Republican participant and the other half how much they would donate to a "conservative" participant. Finally, half of the respondents were asked how much they would donate to a Democrat participant and the other half how much they would donate to a "liberal"participant. 13 The size of the endowment in the dictator games varied slightly between the four studies.
In the Canadian survey, each dictator game question asked respondents to split a prize of 100 Canadian dollars between herself and another participant in the survey. Respondents could choose any amount between 0 and 100 dollars. For each question, one randomly selected dictator-recipient pair received a 100 dollar prize that was shared between them according to the dictator's decision. In the UK study, respondents were asked in each question to allocate 10,000 points which corresponded to prizes of 100 GBP each. As for the Canadian study, one allocation was randomly selected for each type of dictator-recipient pair. In the Swedish study, subjects allocated 1000 SEK in each dictator game. They were told that for each of the …ve questions the allocations of two dictators would be randomly chosen and paid out to the dictators and recipients. In the US study, three prizes of 100 USD were drawn corresponding to each of the three dictator game questions. The total amounts paid out in the studies were consequently 400 Canadian dollars (four prizes of 100 dollars each), 400 GBP (four prizes of 100 GBP each), 10,000 SEK (ten prizes of 1000 SEK) and 300 USD (three 100 dollar prizes), approximately corresponding to 400, 650, 1500 and 300 USD. On average respondents were paid between 7 cents (in the Canadian study) to 1.4 dollars (in the Swedish study). While the stakes involved are quite low, previous studies have found that stakes matter relatively little in dictator games (see e.g. Engel 2011).
In the remainder of the paper, decisions by dictators will be measured as the percentage share of the maximal contribution.
Estimation
We …rst investigate whether ideology (on the left-right scale), preferences for social spending and willingness to pay (WTP) for public goods are related to generosity in the dictator game.
Let DON AT E i denote the donation of respondent i to a completely anonymous recipient,
x i her response to some question about political preferences and let Z i be a vector of control variables. Z i includes income, education, gender, age as well as some additional variables that vary from country to country (see the bottom of Table 1 for details). We estimate the following regression equation (using OLS) for each country separately:
The coe¢ cient 1 is our estimate of the strength of the relationship between generosity and political preferences. We keep the scaling of x i implied by each question, except in one case where we reverse the scale for Sweden in order to make the results comparable to the other countries. The sign of 1 is thus directly comparable between countries for a particular question, but not across questions as it depends on whether high values of x i indicate "left-wing" or "right-wing" political values. We scale the WTP questions so that they are roughly comparable across countries. WTP is measured in 1,000 dollars in the US and Canada, 10,000 SEK in Sweden and strength of approval controlling for the proposed sum in the UK. For the questions about WTP for public goods, 1 > 0 implies that people with a high willingness to pay are more generous in the dictator game.
In order to study the relationship between partisanship and generosity, we again focus on the donation to a completely anonymous recipient. Let P ART Y n i be an indicator variable for whether respondent i identi…es with party n. In Sweden we only distinguish between whether a respondent identi…es with a party in the left-wing or right-wing bloc. The reason is that there are eight political parties in the Swedish parliament, seven of which clearly belong to either bloc (we ignore the anti-immigration party). For the countries with three major parties (Canada and the UK) we estimate the following regression:
whereas the regression only includes P ART Y 1 i for Sweden and the US. The coe¢ cients 1
and 2 indicate the di¤erence in average donations between the respondents who identify with the party in question and those who identify with the baseline party excluded from the regression.
To test whether there is an in-group e¤ect in the dictator game, we regress dictator i's donation to recipient j with known partisanship. The number of decisions per respondent in this regression depends on the number of political parties: two for the US and Sweden and three for Canada and the UK. We estimate the following regression model:
where P ART Y 2 i is only included for Canada and the UK, and SAM E ij is an indicator variable equal to one in case dictator i and recipient j identify with the same party. > 0
indicates that there is a partisan in-group e¤ect. In this and the following speci…cation, we cluster standard errors at the level of the individual since we now include two or three decisions for each respondent.
Finally, to test whether the in-group e¤ect is equally strong among left-wing and rightwing donors, we estimate the following equation:
The coe¢ cients 1 and 2 show how much more or less supporters of party 1 and 2 donate to supporters of their own party compared to recipients from the baseline party. Note that P ART Y 2 i and its interaction term are excluded in regression (3) and (4) Table 1 shows the estimate of 1 and its standard errors for all political preference questions using regression (1) . Note that Table 1 does not report the coe¢ cients for the 14 The …gure for Canada refers to the subsample for which we observe WTP for at least one type of public good. 15 We are only aware of one Swedish dictator game study based on a representative sample. Preliminary and unpublished results from that study are in line with our …nding -more than 50 percent donated half the amount. 14 covariates. The …rst column for each country in Table 1 reports the results when no control variables are included in the regression. The second column shows the result without control variables for respondents with non-missing values for all control variables. The third column reports the estimated coe¢ cient with control variables. A high value of the dependent variable indicates agreement with the statement shown to the left in Table 1 .
As shown in Table 1 , generosity in the dictator game is negatively associated with rightist ideology in Sweden, the UK and the US (the question was not available for Canada). The estimated coe¢ cients imply that moving from 1 to 10 on the left-right scale is associated with an increase in the donated share by 3 (UK) to 16 percentage points (US). The pattern and magnitude of the coe¢ cients are the same also for the questions regarding taxes and income inequality, but weaker for the question about government responsibility. The estimated coe¢ cients are not always statistically signi…cant, but all coe¢ cients indicate a positive relationship between generosity and leftist political values. Except for the UK, the estimated e¤ects are generally strengthened when control variables are added to the regression.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Willingness-to-pay for public goods (and publicly provided private goods) is also positively related to generosity in all countries. In all but one case is the estimated relationship between WTP and generosity stronger when control variables -including income -are included in the regressions. This suggests that the relationship between generosity and WTP is not due to a correlation between generosity and socio-economic factors, such as income and education. The strength of the estimated relationship between WTP and generosity is also non-trivial. For example, in Canada an increase in WTP for medical care by 1,000
Canadian dollars predicts an increase in the donated share by 3.7 to 4.1 percentage points.
We conclude from Table 1 that political preferences are related to generosity in the dictator game. Table 2 presents the results regarding generosity and partisanship. For each country, the left column shows the results for all partisans while the right column shows the result when we restrict the sample to respondents who identify strongly with a political party. Table 2 include the set of covariates. The …rst panel in Table   2 shows the estimated coe¢ cients from regression (2). We …nd that left-wing partisans are more generous than right-wing partisans in Canada and Sweden. In the US, Republicans are less generous than Democrats, but the e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant. Somewhat surprisingly, supporters of Tories and Liberal Democrats in the UK are more generous than supporters of Labour (we discuss the case of the UK separately below). With one exception (Liberal democrats in the UK), the results do not change appreciably when we restrict the sample to strong partisans.
All regressions reported in

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The second panel of Table 2 shows the results from regression (3) that serve to test for an in-group e¤ect with respect to partisanship. The in-group e¤ect is positive and statistically signi…cant in all countries (although less so in the US). The magnitude is nontrivial: dictators donate 5 to 10 percentage points less of their total endowment when faced with a recipient with a di¤erent political view.
The third panel shows that the in-group e¤ect is primarily driven by supporters of leftwing political parties. The interaction e¤ect with respect to right-wing parties is negative in all countries and signi…cantly so in Canada, Sweden and the UK. For example, leftwing partisans in Sweden donate 15 percentage points more to left-wing than to rightwing recipients, whereas right-wing partisans only donate 6 percentage points more to rightwing compared to left-wing recipients. 16 The results are very similar for the sub-sample of participants that identify strongly with a political party, with the US as a possible exception (but in this case most estimated coe¢ cients are not statistically indistinguishable from zero anyway due to a considerably smaller sample size). The results with respect to in-group e¤ects in regression (3) and (4) are very similar when we control for respondent …xed e¤ects, thereby only using variation in allocations to di¤erent recipients within respondents (results available upon request). 17 We conclude from Table 2 that there is an in-group e¤ect in all countries and that it seems to be primarily driven by supporters of left-wing parties. But are the participants aware of their own in-group behavior? One way to investigate this is to test to what extent the in-group e¤ect interacts with the ordering of choices. When asked the …rst question about a partisan recipient, dictators did not know what type of recipient would show up in the next question. In the Swedish survey, we randomized whether respondents should face a left-wing or right-wing recipient after they made the …rst allocation to an anonymous recipient. Half of the subjects were thus asked how much to donate to a left-wing recipient and the other half to a right-wing recipient. This structure of the Swedish survey enables us to re-estimate regression (3) interacing SAM E ij with an indicator variable equal to one for the …rst dictator game with a partisan recipient. As shown in Table A6 , the interaction e¤ect is positive and statistically signi…cant at the 10 percent level, implying that the ingroup e¤ect is weaker in the second partisan dictator game. This suggests that dictators are aware of their own discriminating behavior when they are faced with the second decision and that they respond by discriminating less, presumably because they want to adhere to norms against discrimination.
We have also investigated whether the estimated coe¢ cients from regression (1)-(4) vary across sub-groups. For Canada, the UK and Sweden, we interacted our independent variables of interest with indicator variables for, in turn, below median values for age, income and education, and gender. We run one regression for each type of interaction e¤ect. In general, the associations in the data documented in Table 1 and 2 do not interact with socioeconomic characteristics. There are two exceptions to this rule. First, in Canada the relationship between generosity and willingness to pay for public goods is stronger among young and male respondents. 18 Second, the in-group e¤ect appears to be weaker for younger respondents in Sweden and Canada. 19 These results are available upon request.
The Case of UK
As discussed above, support for left-wing political parties is strongly positively related to generosity in Canada and Sweden and possibly also in the US. What stands out is that conservative partisans are more generous than Labour supporters in the UK. One potential explanation is that conservatives in the UK do not have the same right-wing political preferences as in the other countries. To investigate this hypothesis, Table 3 shows the relationship between partisanship and the survey questions about political preferences from Table 1 . The dependent variables in Table 3 are the response to the political preference questions and the independent variables are indicator variables for the preferred party and the same control variables as in Table 1 and 2.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
As shown in Table 3 , right-wing partisanship is related to typical right-wing policies in all four countries, including the UK. However, despite the systematic relationship between partisanship and political preferences on the one hand, and between political preferences and generosity on the other, conservatives in the UK are more generous than left-wing party supporters. This suggests either that there is an omitted variable that is correlated with both partisanship and generosity in the UK, or that people who identify with a party are di¤erent from non-partisans. We test whether there is a di¤erence in the relationship between political preferences and generosity by estimating the regressions in Table 4 for partisans and non-partisans separately. As shown in Table 4 , the results are very similar for partisans and non-partisans in all countries but the UK where willingness to pay for public goods is uncorrelated with generosity among partisans. It thus appears to be something about partisans in the UK which implies that political preferences are not correlated with generosity in this particular group.
[ 
Swedish Pilot Study
Before carrying out the Swedish survey study, we conducted a laboratory experiment with high school students in Sweden. Although the pilot sample is not representative of the general population, participants are not self-selected into participating (participation was mandatory) and the stakes are considerably larger than in the other country studies. Detailed results from this pilot experiment are presented in Appendix and summarized brie ‡y here.
The pilot study included one dictator game per respondent. In this game, the political partisanship of the recipient was known to the dictator, implying that we can estimate speci…cation (3) and (4) but not (1) and (2) where the recipient was completely anonymous.
The results from the pilot study con…rm the strong relationship between left-wing partisanship and generosity found in the Swedish survey study. Right-wing donors donate about 50 percent less on average than left-wing donors. In contrast, we found only weak evidence of an in-group e¤ect.
While there is no obvious explanation as to why the in-group e¤ect is weaker in the pilot study, a potential explanation lies in the design of the experiment. In the pilot, the respondents were told that the recipients were students in another class room. To the extent that students already think of students in other classes as an "outgroup", the political views of the recipients may play a smaller role. In the …nal Swedish survey study we avoid this ambiguity since the political partisanship is the only information respondents have about the recipients.
Conclusion
We have shown that there is a positive relationship between generosity in the dictator game and support for social spending, the provision of public goods and income redistribution.
With the UK as a notable exception, there is also a relationship between left-wing partisanship and generosity. In addition, we have shown that generosity is contingent on the political party preference of the recipient -in particular left-wing donors tend to give more to recipients who share their political views.
Our results thus indicate that people who behave generously towards others also support generosity on the part of the government and are more likely to align with parties on the left of the political spectrum. This suggests that political competition -in our case in four rather di¤erent countries -sorts individuals into political parties according basic preferences.
While we cannot rule out self-interest as a determinant of political preferences, our results do suggest that it is a relatively restrictive assumption. The assumption of purely selfinterested voters in theoretical models should therefore be made with caution. For example, voter turnout is hard to explain if voters are self-interested and rational, but can easily be resolved if voters are assumed to be altruistic (e.g. Edlin et al. 2007 , Loewen 2011 Furthermore, a link between political values and generosity suggests that the correlation between economic status and support for redistribution may not only re ‡ect self-interest.
For example, if preferences for redistribution are determined by generosity and generosity also determines the propensity to choose a low-paid occupation, then low income might be spuriously related to preferences for redistribution. 20 Fowler (2006) shows that altruism (as measured by dictator game giving) is indeed positively related to voter turnout.
20
A methodological challenge in measuring generosity is that behavior in the dictator game could be a¤ected by social image concerns (as highlighted by Andreoni & Bernheim 2009 ). An alternative interpretation of our …ndings is therefore that leftist subjects are more concerned about social image. We …nd this view less convincing, partly because participants in our experiments are anonymous, but it might nevertheless be interesting to disentangle the two possible explanations in future research.
Another challenge is to understand why political preferences and generosity are correlated. For example, can generosity can be viewed as a determinant of political preferences in the sense that people form their political views based upon a set of (more or less) …xed basic preferences to which generosity belongs? A potential avenue for exploring this question is to measure generosity early in life and then link this information to generosity and political views in adulthood. Relatedly, a growing body of work in the behavior genetics of politics suggests that both social and political preferences are heritable (Alford et al. 2005 , Cesarini et al. 2009 ), raising the question of whether they share the same underlying genetic structure. 
B Additional Information about Canadian Study
The Canadian study was conducted in May 2007 by a Canadian commercial public opinion research …rm. As the survey was conducted online, respondents were required to login to the survey using a unique identi…cation. People completing the survey for the …rst time responded to a number of screening questions, including a query about their partisan identi…cation. All respondents were presented with a series of questions about recent news exposure, attention to federal and provincial politics, and views on various politicians. Subjects then completed an eight-item measure of empathy based on a larger instrument (see Loewen et al. 2007 , Wakabayashi et al. 2006 ) as well as four dictator games. Following this, subjects answered questions concerning their support for public spending, past charitable giving, views of the public service, and views of recent political events.
The dictator game experiment consisted of four iterations. Subjects read an introduction to the game and were then presented with instructions. Upon being informed that they would have four chances to win one of four $100 prizes at the end of the survey, subjects were asked how much they would like to share with a completely anonymous individual about whom they know nothing and who would never know their identity. Subjects entered their preferred split. The game was then repeated three times with subjects being informed that the anonymous recipient supports the Conservative, Liberal, or New Democratic parties. The order of the recipients was randomized. Respondents could give away any amount between $0 and $100. Table A2 shows the exact wording of the survey questions (excluding control variables) that are included in the analysis in this paper.
[TABLE A2 HERE]
C Additional Information about Swedish Study
The survey was conducted in May 2011 by the commercial public opinion research …rm SIFO using their Internet panel. The survey …rst asked subjects about their political preferences, party identi…cation and the WTP questions. These questions were followed by a number of questions about background characteristics (gender, age, income, education etc.). After these questions, subjects were asked how they would like to split 1000 SEK with another anonymous participant in the study. Subjects were told that they would be faced with a number of such decisions and that two proposers and two recipients would be randomly 28 selected for payment for each decision. Subjects were asked …ve di¤erent questions, so in total 10 proposers and 10 receivers were paid. At end of the survey subjects were asked to state their postal address and 20 randomly selected subjects were subsequently contacted to administer payments.
The …ve dictator game decisions were shown on a separate screen with no possibility to go back and revise earlier decisions. The …rst decision was how to allocate 1000 SEK between themselves and any randomly selected participant in the study. For half of the subjects, the second question was how much they would donate to someone to the left and the third question how much they would give to someone to the right. The other half of the subjects took these decisions in reverse order. Finally, subjects were asked to state how much they would like to give to someone from the largest right-wing party ("Moderaterna") and to someone form the largest left-wing party ("Socialdemokraterna"), and the order of the two questions was again randomized. Table A3 shows the exact wording of the survey questions that are included in the analysis in this paper.
[ read an introduction to the game. They were then informed that they would be eligible to win additional prizes worth 10,000 points (which equals 100 GBP). Subjects were told that the amount of the prize they would receive would depend on their decisions in the four games which followed. They were then asked how much they would like to share with an anonymous recipient, an anonymous recipient who typically supports the Conservative party, another who typically supports the Labour party, and another recipient who typically supports the Liberal Democrats. Recipient order was randomized. Respondents could allocate any amount of points between 0 and 10000. Table A4 shows the exact wording of all the survey questions that are included in the analysis in this paper.
E Additional information about US Study
Subjects in the US study completed their experimental sessions in a computer lab. Each session lasted approximately 60 minutes. Subjects were asked a number of screening questions, including demographic information and their partisan identi…cation. Subjects where asked a few political questions, including the WTP questions. This was followed by some unrelated questions about theory of mind. These were followed by some questions about political preferences. After completing these questions, subjects read instructions for the dictator game. Subjects were instructed that three prizes of $100 would be drawn according to their decisions in the three tasks that followed. In a …rst-round, they were asked how much they would donate to a completely anonymous individual. Subjects were then asked how much they would donate to a conservative recipient or how much they would donate to a Republican recipient. Finally, they were asked how much they would donate to a liberal recipient or to a Democratic recipient. After completing the dictator games, subjects completed a number of other tasks before the termination of the study. Table A5 shows the exact wording of the questions that are included in the analysis in 30 this paper.
[ were between the age of 16 to 19 and attended study programs within engineering, natural science or social science. The total number of participating students was 186.
Two di¤erent classes (seated in di¤erent classrooms) took part in each experimental session which lasted about 45 minutes. The framing of the experiment was made as neutral as possible. The experiment proceeded in three di¤erent steps.
In the …rst step the subjects were asked to state their political orientation as predominately "left"or "right"on a preprinted answer sheet. 22 At this point they did not know the purpose of the question nor did they have any information about the upcoming stages of the experiment. The answers were collected while the subjects remained quiet and seated.
Each subject was then randomly matched with another subject in the other classroom who in turn was paired with a third subject in the …rst classroom. This procedure thus formed a chain of subjects in which every subject acted both as donor and as recipient to di¤erent, randomly assigned subjects. We did not pair speci…c couples since we wanted to remove the possibility that subjects engaged in some kind of reciprocal behavior. Subjects did not know with which two persons they interacted and were told that it would not be revealed after the experiment.
In the second step, the subjects were given the instructions of the dictator game and an envelope with information regarding the political orientation of their randomly assigned recipient, i.e., whether the recipient considered him-or herself as primarily "left"or "right" on the political spectrum. Subjects received no other information regarding the identity of the recipient. We informed subjects of the recipient's political orientation since we wanted to test for an in-group e¤ect, i.e., whether dictators are more generous toward recipients with the same political orientation. After the subjects were provided with the political orientation of the recipient, they were asked to split the endowment of 100 SEK (approximately $10 to $15) between themselves and the recipient and indicate their choice on an answer sheet to be placed in a sealed envelope. 23 The envelopes were collected after everyone had made their decision.
After the experiment, we randomly selected the subjects in one classroom the role of "dictators". The subjects in the remaining classroom were assigned the role of "recipients".
That is, money was only distributed according to half of the subjects'decisions as dictators.
The subjects were informed about the amount of money they had earned (and thus indirectly whether they had been assigned the role of donor or recipient) in a letter sent by regular mail about two weeks after the experiment. This letter also contained the money that the subject earned in the experiment.
In the third and last stage of the experiment, the subjects were given a short question-naire with a battery of questions regarding their sex, religious and political views, family background, interest in politics and beliefs about the generosity and trustworthiness of people with di¤erent political views. Subjects were also asked to provide a written motivation for their particular choice of splitting the endowment. The subjects were explicitly informed that the experiment was over and that the questionnaire constituted the …nal step of the study and that their answers would not be revealed to anyone else.
G.2 Independent Variables
We include dummy variables for the donor's gender and whether donors responded that they are religious or not. In addition, we include the number of parents with university education (0, 1 or 2), how interested the participant is in politics on a four-point scale and how often the participant reads newspapers on a four point scale. We did not collect information about age since all subjects were of very similar age. Parents' education serves as a proxy for socioeconomic status of the student (there is likely to be little variation in student income and we did not expect students to be well-informed about the income of their parents).
The di¤erences between left-and right-wing subjects are small in terms of these background variables. The only statistically signi…cant di¤erences are that women tend to be more leftist (p = 0:093) and those whose parents have low levels of education are more likely to identify themselves as leftist (p = 0:072).
G.3 Results
Since we did not include the possibility to donate to a completely anonymous recipient, we cannot estimate speci…cation (1) and (2). Table A7 therefore only displays the result for speci…cations (3) and (4). We estimate the same speci…cation as for the other studies, but we only have one observation for each individual (in contrast to the survey studies), so we do not cluster the standard errors in these regressions.
[TABLE A7 HERE]
The …rst column displays the results without any controls. In this case, the right-wing partisanship is associated with an increase in donations of 19.80 percentage points and the coe¢ cient is strongly statistically di¤erent from zero. Dictators who are faced with a recipient with similar political views give 2.87 percentage units more on average, but the e¤ect is small and not statistically di¤erent from zero. As shown in the second and third columns, including the set of control variables implies a weaker relationship between right-wing partisanship and generosity. The main reason is the inclusion of school …xed e¤ects -in one of the schools there was a larger proportion of right-wing subjects and average donations were lower in that school.
The last three columns of Table A7 includes the interaction between donor and recipient partisanship in order to test whether the e¤ect of the recipient's partisanship varies between right-and left-wing donors. The interaction e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant.
As a robustness test, we re-run our regressions removing the 12 subjects who gave "inconsistent" responses on their political orientation in the …rst stage and in the subsequent questionnaire. The results do not change appreciably from this test (the size of the coef-…cients of interest becomes slightly larger, but the levels of statistical signi…cance are the same).
One potential reason why left-wing donors are more generous is that political orientation is correlated with a belief that others will be more generous in the dictator game. However, the mean responses on questions about the generosity of other people in the questionnaire are almost exactly the same for people with left-wing and right-wing orientation, and controlling for the perceived level of generosity among others does not a¤ect the estimates reported in Table A7 . People with right-wing opinions are somewhat less likely to have friends of both right-wing and left-wing orientation, but controlling for this in regression does not change the results appreciably either. We interpret this as tentative evidence that right-wing donors were not, in general, motivated by a belief that they would, themselves, receive small or no 34 donations if the roles of donor and recipient were reversed. The written comments support this notion. The majority of dictators who choose to send nothing or only a small amount of money motivated this choice by pure self-interest (e.g., "I wanted as much money as possible for myself"). In sharp contrast, many dictators who choose to send 50 percent motivate this choice with concerns for fairness (e.g., "I don't think it is fair if I keep all the money to myself"). 
Controls observed
Each coefficient corresponds to a specific regression. The dependent variable is the donated sum in a dictator game. All coefficients expressed in percent of maximum donation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. One star denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level in a two-sided test; two stars denote significance at the 5 percent level and one star at the 1 percent level. The vector of control variables (included in the rightmost column for each country) includes a quadratic in age, gender, education and family/household income for all countries. In addition, the vector includes citizenship (US and CAN); ethnicity (US and UK); employment status (CAN and SWE); region of residence (CAN and UK); marital status, number of children and personal income (SWE). The sign of the "Government" question has been reversed for Sweden in order to make the results comparable to the US. WTP for climate, medical care and tuition fees expressed in 1,000 dollars (US and CAN); 10,000 SEK (SWE) or strength of approval on a 1-5 scale controlling for the proposed sum (UK). WTP for tuition in Sweden transformed from a question asking respondents whether they want to tuition fees to be enacted and, if so, the desired amount. The dependent variable is the donated sum in a dictator game. All coefficients expressed in percent of maximum donation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. One star denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level in a two-sided test; two stars denote significance at the 5 percent level and one star at the 1 percent level. All regressions include the same set of controls as in Table 1 . The "Same" variable for Sweden is calculated based upon consistency between the party affiliation of the dictator and the response to the continuous left-right question of the respondent. Respondents who identify themselves as "Independent" and "Other" excluded for the US. We drop all respondents in the region Quebec from the Canadian sample. Respondents who identify with parties other than Labour, Liberal democrats and Conservative excluded for the UK while respondents who identify with "Sverigedemokraterna" excluded in the case of Sweden. Only respondents who give a response for donations to all types of recipients included in the sample. All partisans Strong partisans The dependent variables are political opinions measured on a 1-10 scale where 10 implies that respondents approve of the statement implied by the question, or WTP for public goods. WTP for climate, medical care and tuition fees expressed in 1,000 dollars (US and CAN); 10,000 SEK (SWE) or strength of approval on a 1-5 scale controlling for the proposed sum (UK). WTP for tuition in Sweden transformed from a question asking respondents whether they want to tuition fees to be enacted and, if so, the desired amount. WTP for drugs for cancer treatment expressed in terms of hours waiting time for non-emergency care, except for the UK where WTP is measured as strength of approval on a 1-5 scale controlling for proposed waiting time. All regressions include the same set of controls as in Table 1 . The same sample restrictions as in Table 2 are imposed for each country. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. One star denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level in a two-sided test; two stars denote significance at the 5 percent level and one star at the 1 percent level. The dependent variable is the donated sum in a dictator game. All coefficients expressed in percent of maximum donation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. One star denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level in a two-sided test; two stars denote significance at the 5 percent level and one star at the 1 percent level. Variables have the same definition and unit of measurement as in Table 1 . All regressions include the full set of controls as defined in Table 1 . In Canada and the United Kingdom, "Partisanship" defined as some identification with a party. In Sweden, "non-partisans" also include "weak-partisans" as there are very few individuals in Sweden who do not identify with a party at all. In the US, "partisans" are defined as respondents who identify (weakly or strongly) with the Democratic or Republican party while Independents are defined as "non-partisan". Respondents who identify with "other" parties are excluded from the US sample. 
Dictator game question (anonymous)
At the end of this study, we'll be conducting a random draw for $ 100. All respondents who complete the study will be eligible. If you win, you'll have the chance to share your prize with another completely anonymous individual who also completed the survey. Please keep in mind that whether you share your prize will have no effect on your chances of winning! Also, you will never know the identity of the person with whom you share the prize and they'll never know your identity. Finally, remember that you don't have to share anything if you don't wish. If you won the prize, how much would you give to a completely anonymous individual? 0 to $100. 
Government less responsibility
How would you describe your opinion on the following scale from 1 to 10. 1 being that you fully agree with the statement to the left; 10 being that you fully agree with the statement to the right. If you regard your opinion to be somewhere inbetween, choose the number that is best in accord with your own opinion.
1. People should take more responsibility for themselves. ... 10. The Government should take more responsibility for providing all citizens with what they need.
WTP Climate
One proposed action to combat climate change and reduce air pollution is to raise taxes on fossil fuels. Advocates of this claim that it would lead to cleaner air as well as to improve people's health. Would you advocate a tax increase on fossil fuels if the higher tax implied a total cost of X kronor per year to heat your home, drive a car, travel etc.?
Asked sequentially (yes/no question until negative answer): 500, 1000, 2500, 5000, 10000, 20000 and 40000 SEK.
WTP Medical care
The waiting times for a range of medical procedures within the health care system are by many considered to be too long (surgery for hip-joints and cataracts are often mentioned as examples in the debate). How much more would you be prepared to pay in tax per year to ensure the significant reduction of queues in the health care system?
WTP Tuition
Swedish universities have recently introduced tuition fees for foreign students. Some argue that a tuition fee should also apply for Swedish students. How high do you think the tuition fees for Swedes should be if the revenue was used to lower taxes for everyone?
Six response alternatives: 40 000 kronor per term, 20 000 kronor per term, 20 000 kronor per term, 5 000 kronor per term, 1 000 kronor per term, No tuition fees should be introduced.
Party ID
When thinking about Swedish politics, do you usually view yourself as… All parties in parliament and "none"
Strength of partisanship
How strongly do you identify yourself with the party in the previous question? 1. Very strongly 2. Quite strongly. 3. Not particularly strongly. 4. Weakly.
Dictator game question (anonymous)
You will now face a couple of decisions where you have the opportunity to choose how you would distribute 1000 kronor between yourself and an anonymous counterpart who is also a participant in this study. For each decision below, two participants will be chosen at random and they will both receive the amount they asked for out of the 1000 kronor and the remainder will be paid out to a randomly selected counterpart. Participants in the study constitute a representative sample of the population and your decision remains anonymous to other participants in the study.
If the recipient is another randomly selected participant in this study I want to keep ____ kronor and give ____ kronor to the counterpart. Wait times for many medical procedures (such as cataract surgery and hip and knee replacements) are currently longer than recommended by doctors. If tax dollars were guaranteed to go to these priority areas and to reduce wait times, would you support this policy if it were to cost X? £2000, £1500, £1000, £500 and £100.
WTP Tuition
Some politicians and policy groups propose making the first four years of university free for all qualified students. This will result in greater accessibility to university education. Would you support the elimination of tuition fees if it cost you X more per year in taxes?
£100, £250, £500, £1000 and £2000. At the end of this study, we'll be conducting a random draw for £ 100. All respondents who complete the study will be eligible. If you win, you'll have the chance to share your prize with another completely anonymous individual who also completed the survey. Please keep in mind that whether you share your prize will have no effect on your chances of winning! Also, you will never know the identity of the person with whom you share the prize and they'll never know your identity. Finally, remember that you don't have to share anything if you don't wish. If you won the prize, how much would you give to a completely anonymous individual?
If you won the prize, how much would you give to a completely anonymous individual? The dependent variable is the donated sum in a dictator game. All coefficients expressed in percent of maximum donation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. One star denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level in a two-sided test; two stars denote significance at the 5 percent level and one star at the 1 percent level. All regressions include the same set of controls as in Table 2 for Sweden. The "Same" variable for Sweden is calculated based upon consistency between the party affiliation of the dictator and the response to the continuous left-right question of the respondent. Respondents who identify with "Sverigedemokraterna" are excluded. 
